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Abraham Lincoln did not liberate the slaves after a long 
devotion and laborious commitment to the cause of abolition. 
He came to the presidency with a record that placed him in the 
tradition of a conservative Whig. In 1848, when many of his 
more liberal fellow Whigs were joining the Free Soil party, he 
was speaking and campaigning for a slaveholder, Zachary 
Taylor, the Whig choice for the presidency. Until the end Lin-
coln never tired of telling friends that he was a Henry Clay Whig 
in his principles and philosophy. Like Clay, Lincoln was an 
advocate of the colonization of blacks, a position which put him 
in the ranks of one of the country's most anti-Negro organiza-
tion during the antebellum period. 
But, as a humanitarian, Lincoln rejected measures of the 
more vindictive wing of colonizers who incited prejudice that 
resulted in violence against blacks. Lincoln 's approach to col-
onization was similar to that of Joseph C. Hornblower and 
Courtlandt Van Rensselear, long-time directors of the American 
Colonization Society, who hoped the Society could be changed 
into a humanitarian movement to restore individual blacks to a 
life of freedom and self-determinism. 1 When the Republican 
party was organized in Illinois in 1854, Lincoln refused to iden-
tify with the party because of the strong antislavery antecedents 
of the founders of the movement. During the presidential can-
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vass of 1856, although he campaigned for John C. Fremont, 
Lincoln's conservatism led him to keep his distance and refrain 
from a complete break with those who hoped to revive the Whig 
party. 2 
Recent scholars have portrayed Lincoln as maturing into a 
full-fledged Radical as the war developed. In his excellent study 
of the Radical Republicans, Hans L. Trefousse concludes that 
Lincoln pursued the same goals as the Radicals, but he was 
"more astute and possessed better political instincts than the 
Radicals." In the end, the president "accomplished practically 
everything the advanced members of the party wanted." While 
Lincoln "cooperated with the Radicals," his relationship was 
voluntary and "he always retained the upper hand." 3 More 
recently, Peyton Mccrary has examined Lincoln's reconstruc-
tion policy in Louisiana and found that, just before his death, 
Lincoln had decided to scrap Nathaniel Ban~ s' moderate pro-
gram, align himself with the Congressional Radicals' Recon-
struction policy, and support the Louisiana Radicals in recon-
structing the state. 4 
Was Lincoln a cautious Radical from the beginning of his 
political career? Did he mature into Radicalism with the prog-
ress of the war and the revolutionary tendencies of the struggle? 
Research on Lincoln's slave policy in Kentucky reveals that he 
remained cautious, conservative by nature and philosophy, but 
also pragmatic. Lincoln best expressed his personal views of ser-
vitude in his simple statement, "If slavery is not wrong, nothing 
is wrong.'' But, being a pragmatist, he carefully distinguished 
between "what ought to be" and the realities of what actually 
was. ~ Lincoln's conservatism arose in part from a sound sense 
for the progress of historical change. 6 This was best revealed in 
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his efforts to reconcile the views of the border state Unionists 
and the antislavery nationalists during the Civil War. Through-
out the war Lincoln was plagued by constantly antagonistic 
forces: on the one hand was Kentucky with its determination to 
restore "the Union as it was and the Constitution as it is," and, 
on the other, antislavery radicalism with its commitment to 
destroy slavery. The difficulty of reconciling these opposing 
forces, which Lincoln failed to achieve, created "a problem 
hardly less serious than the war itself." ' 
In sympathy and culture Kentucky was tied to the South; 
politically, the heritage of Clay's nationalism identified the state 
with the Union. When its statesmen could not prevent the 
breaking up of the Union, Kentucky refused to join either side. 
On May 16, 1861, the Kentucky legislature adopted a policy of 
neutrality for the state, a position which presented a grave chal-
lenge to Lincoln's leadership. Informed people realized that 
Kentucky must ultimately throw its allegiance to either North or 
South. Lincoln was well aware that the ultimate destiny of Ken-
tucky, as well as the other border states, would be determined 
by the stance of the Union regarding slavery. And it was a vital 
question, for the population advantage of the North with the 
border states was five to two; without them, it would be only 
three to two.' 
From the beginning of the "rebellion," Lincoln felt that 
Kentucky "would be a turning weight in the scale of War." The 
Commonwealth held such a strategic position that Lincoln 
thought a Kentucky decision to join the Confederacy would be 
fateful for the Union cause. The Confederacy might have there 
an almost impregnable defense line along the banks of the Ohio 
River. 9 Consideration of the border states , rather than the Con-
federacy, doubtless prompted Lincoln to remind the South, in 
his inaugural address of March 4, 1861, that the Republican 
platform of 1860 guaranteed the inviolate rights of the states 
"to order and control their own domestic institutions." He pro-
mised that this right would remain thus exclusively under the 
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state control. 10 Lincoln seldom lost an opportunity to assure 
Kentucky that the war would not be conducted against slavery.' 1 
In June 1861 , the Kentucky congressional elections were 
held. Informed observers reported that Lincoln had postponed 
calling a special session of Congress until July, because he 
feared that antislavery congressmen might provoke a conflict 
between pivotal Kentucky and the federal government. 12 But 
Lincoln's inaugural address position was sustained by Congress: 
on July 22, the day after the Battle of Bull Run, the House of 
Representatives passed the Crittenden Resolution; the Senate 
approved it two days later. The resolution declared that the war 
was "not conducted for the purpose of interfering with the 
rights or established institutions of the states ... but to main-
tain the constitution, and to preserve the Union." 13 
Kentucky' s congressional delegation, however, was less 
than enthusiastic about another act passed at the same time. 
The Confiscation Act, which freed all slaves used to support 
Confederate military activities, was opposed by the delegations 
of Kentucky and the other border states; nonetheless, the act 
was adopted without a division of votes. 1• On Sunday, Aug-
ust 14, the day before the extra session of Congress ended, Ken-
tucky representatives Robert Mallory, John J . Crittenden, and 
James S. Jackson called on Lincoln to urge him to veto the Con-
fiscation Act. Although they did not secure his positive pledge 
to do so, the Kentuckians were reassured that Lincoln sympa-
'
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thized with their views. Lincoln, with some reservations, did 
sign the bill, although he had grave misgivings about its timing . 
With Kentucky's ultimate position still in doubt, the president 
feared the act's potential adverse effects on the Bluegrass 
State.15 
At this crucial moment, Union General John C. Fremont, 
commander of the Department of the West, issued a proclama-
tion on August 30, freeing all Missouri slaves owned by persons 
resisting the United States or aiding and abetting the Confed-
eracy. This thunderstruck Kentucky and stunned ardent Ken-
tucky Unionists. Western Kentuckians were especially ap-
prehensive that Fremont and the Union forces would extend the 
measure to their counties . Although the Fremont proclamation 
provided for emancipation only in Missouri, many Kentuckians 
feared its wider application, if sustained by the president. They 
foresaw that Fremont' s move would convert a war for the pres-
ervation of the Union into a war for the extermination of 
slavery. 16 
Union supporters in Kentucky flooded the national capital 
with their complaints against Fremont. On September 1, Joshua 
Speed, Lincoln's friend and roommate in Springfield from 1837 
to 1841 , wrote the president from Louisville: "Our constitution 
and laws prohibit the emancipation of slaves among us - even 
in small numbers. If a military commander can turn them loose 
by the thousands by mere proclamation - it will be a most diffi-
cult matter to get our people to submit to it. " Speed reported 
Kentucky' s fears that Fremont's proclamation might cause their 
slaves to claim freedom. Two days later Speed predicted that the 
majority of the Kentucky Unionists would leave the party if the 
proclamation stood: " So fixed is public sentiment in this state 
against freeing Negroes . . . that you had as well at tack the free-
dom of worship in the North or the right of a parent to teach his 
child to read as to wage war in the state on such principles," he 
warned Lincoln. Garrett Davis, a powerful force among conser-
"Speech of Ro bert Mallory, J une 15, 1864, Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., !st sess., 
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vative Unionists in Kentucky, wrote Secretary of the Treasury 
Salmon P. Chase that the proclamation had the effect in the 
state of "a bombshell" and had "greatly disconcerted and I fear 
scattered us." Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt was told by 
a fellow Kentuckian of the possible unforeseen but dangerous 
results if the proclamation was "not disavowed by the adminis-
tration"; "The hopes of our b.est, most talented and sanguine 
Union men seemed now almost destroyed." 11 
To impress upon Lincoln the urgency of the crisis in Ken-
tucky, Joshua Speed solicited Holt's aid. "Several defeats like 
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Portrait of Joshua Fry Speed and Fanny Henning Speed, by G. P. A. Healy. 
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that of Bull Run,'' Speed warned, could be better endured by 
Kentucky Unionists than Fremont's proclamation, "if endorsed 
by the administration." He reported to Holt on a meeting of 
Union leaders and Colonel Robert Anderson , commander of 
the Department of Kentucky, during which all present expressed 
fears that the Union cause in Kentucky had been seriously weak-
ened. Speed pleaded with Holt to use whatever influence he had 
to have the proclamation withdrawn. 11 In Frankfort, waiting to 
take his seat in the Kentucky legislature, James Speed, Joshua's 
brother, telegraphed Lincoln that the freeing of slaves in Mis-
souri would be condemned by the Kentucky General Assem-
bly. 19 Anderson, the former commander at Fort Sumter and a 
native Kentuckian, cautioned Lincoln that if Fremont's procla-
mation was "not immediately disowned and annulled" Ken-
tucky would be "lost to the Union." The colonel reported that a 
company of Union volunteers in Kentucky had thrown down 
their arms and disbanded when they heard of the proclamation. 
From Louisville, three Unionists wired Joshua Speed, in care of 
Lincoln, in Washington: "There is not a day to lose in disavow-
ing emancipation or Kentucky is gone over the mill dam.' ' 20 
Many loyal Kentuckians expressed not only public opposi-
tion to Fremont's proclamation but strong private sentiments as 
well. Alfred Pirtle, James Speed's former law partner, wrote in 
his diary that the proclamation was "despotism, the most fear-
ful on the globe." The diary entry of John F. Jefferson, the son 
of a Louisville Home Guard member, labeled the proclamation 
"too severe" and "generally denounced by Union men."21 Ken-
tucky newspapers unanimously denounced the proclamation 
and incited public opinion almost to the breaking point. Editor 
George D. Prentice's Louisville Journal strongly condemned 
the proclamation as "dangerous and odious, and should, we 
trust, be promptly repudiated by the Government. " The Lex-
"Joshua Speed to Joseph Holt, September 7, 1861, JHP. 
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ington Kentucky Statesman was more severe: " Rather let the 
Union and the Government be destroyed a hundred times than 
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that the military dictator be permitted to enforce this proclama-
tion," thundered the editor. 22 As other newspapers joined in 
protest, 21 a correspondent to the Cincinnati Daily Times re-
ported that Fremont's proclamation was the "all-absorbing" 
topic of the day in central Kentucky, and the measure was doing 
"incalculable injury" throughout the state of Kentucky. In 
Frankfort a petition asked the legislature to devise appropriate 
action against the proclamation. 24 
Lincoln did not need to test further the border state re-
sponse. In touch with "many eminent men of Kentucky, includ-
ing a large majority of Kentucky's members of Congress," Lin-
coln declared that Fremont had exceeded his military authority 
in dealing with far-reaching matters of policy. The chief ex-
ecutive, "in a spirit of caution and not of censure," asked Fre-
mont to revise his proclamation so that it conformed to the 
limited powers of the Confiscation Act of August 6, 1861. Lin-
coln informed Fremont that the general's action would alarm 
Southern friends, probably turn them against the Union, and 
"perhaps ruin our fair prospect for Kentucky." 2s 
The strong-minded and stubborn Fremont would not 
relent. In the meantime, Unionist strength in Kentucky deterio-
rated. The State Rights Democrats, meeting in Frankfort on 
September 10, denounced the proclamation as "a manifest vio-
lation of the Constitution," and called for its "unqualified con-
demnation" by citizens. The editor of the Democratic Kentucky 
Statesman incorrectly reported that the president's cabinet 
approved the proclamation and that the Washington govern-
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ment was sustaining "the dictatorship of an anti-slavery 
fanatic. " 26 By September 11 , the problem had become so criti-
cal that Lincoln ordered Fremont to change the proclamation 
"to conform with and not transcend" the Confiscation Act of 
August 6. A series of letters between Holt and Lincoln written 
the next day indicate that Lincoln had already revoked Fre-
mont's proclamation. These letters and Lincoln's order of Sep-
tember 11 were sent to James Speed and then made available to 
the press. The people of Kentucky thus learned that Lincoln had 
rejected Fremont's proclamation. 21 
The Fremont proclamation, issued August 30, had come at 
a most inopportune time in the struggle for the loyalty of Ken-
tucky. Almost immediately, Confederate General Leonidas 
Polk ordered his troops to occupy the strategic river port of 
Columbus, Kentucky. General Gideon Pillow took the city on 
September 4, and Union forces ·in turn seized Paducah. Gov-
ernor Beriah Magoffin, who sympathized with the Confeder-
acy, ordered both armies to withdraw. Lincoln revoked Fre-
mont's proclamation on September 11; the following day, dis-
patches from Washington assured the Union press "that the 
correction desired by the Union men of Kentucky" had been 
secured. "The Kentucky legislature would not budge," Lincoln 
confessed, "till the proclamation was modified ." The Kentucky 
General Assembly demanded a unilateral withdrawal of Con-
federate troops, and followed this up on September 13 by enter-
ing the war against the Confederacy. 21 The state legislature later 
extended thanks to Lincoln for the way he had resolved the Fre-
mont matter. Dr. T. S. Bell of Louisville, one of the state' s most 
thorough Unionists, declared: " The President handled that 
"Louisville Doily Democrat, September 12, 1861; Lexington Semi-Weekly States-
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matter with an honesty of purpose, and good sense that I have 
never seen surpassed." 29 
Intelligence from Kentucky had convinced Lincoln that the 
very arms he had furnished Kentucky might have been turned 
against the government, if something had not been done. "l 
think to lose Kentucky is nearly to lose the whole game,'' he 
wrote an Illinois senator on September 22. "Kentucky gone, we 
cannot hold Missouri, nor I think Maryland. These all against 
us, the job on our hands is too large for us." 10 The revocation 
of Fremont's decree saved Kentucky for the Union, and 
brought over forty thousand Kentucky soldiers into the Federal 
ranks. It also saved Kentucky from a bloody intrastate conflict 
that would have left the people of the Commonwealth per-
manently divided. Had the presidency been held by a man with 
less understanding of Kentucky's sentiment and less tact, this 
pivotal state might have been lost and the Ohio River might 
have become the battle line boundary. 1 1 
Yet Lincoln did not emerge from the crisis unscathed . Fre-
mont insisted that Lincoln "openly direct" him to make the 
correction in the proclamation. When Lincoln published the 
order it caused an uproar among antislavery forces and seri-
ously damaged his standing with evangelical religious groups. 32 
After Fremont was ordered to modify the proclamation, he had 
two hundred copies of his original decree printed for distribu-
tion throughout the country. Since the president had withheld 
his September 11 order from publication until its receipt by Fre-
mont, it was included in the sequence of Holt-Lincoln corre-
spondence prepared for Kentucky consumption; this gave the 
appearance that Lincoln had yielded to pressure from Ken-
tucky. 
Hostility against the suppression of Fremont's proclama-
"Moore, Rebellion Record, Ill, 117; T . S. Bell to Joseph Holt, September 19, 
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tion was thus directed primarily against Kentucky instead of 
Lincoln. James Russell Lowell asked the people of the North, 
"How many times are we to save Kentucky and lose our self-
respect?" George Hoadly, a future governor of Ohio, privately 
warned a member of Lincoln's cabinet: "Let Mr. Lincoln, while 
he is conciliating the contemptible state of Kentucky, a state 
which ought to have been coerced long ago, bear in mind that 
Kentucky Historical Society Collection 
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the Free States may want a little conciliation, that they are not 
wasting their substance to secure niggers of traitors. " 33 Ken-
tucky became a pariah to the antislavery North . If this senti-
ment became dominant in the government, the consequence for 
Kentucky would be dire. 
Fremont's removal from command on November 2, 1861, 
did not resolve the controversy over emancipation. In a speech 
on November 13 to his regiment, Colonel John Cochrane, 
nephew of abolitionist Gerrit Smith, took ground in favor of 
"the military necessity of unconditional emancipation." Secre-
tary of War Simon Cameron was present and spoke approvingly 
of Cochrane's doctrine, which included the arming of slaves. A 
new crisis immediately developed in Kentucky and Cameron 
became the target of the attack launched against emancipa-
tion. 34 During the last ten days of November, opposition to the 
secretary of war intensified in Kentucky. A correspondent to the 
Louisville Democrat, in agreement with the editor's endorse-
ment of Cameron's removal, stated "I go for direct removal," 
and added that the men of Oldham County "would not fight 
with Negroes and abolitionists." On November 23, a conven-
tion of Union men in Kentucky met in Frankfort and con-
demned proposals to arm blacks for military service. Copies of 
the resolution were sent to Crittenden and Lincoln. 35 
On December 1, Cameron issued the Annual Report of the 
War Department and mailed copies to the press before sending 
it to the president. When the president learned of Cameron's 
recommendations - of emancipation and arming of slaves -
he required the secretary to recall and revise the report. Some 
copies were not returned, however, and the unrevised recom-
mendations began to appear in print. When the president pre-
sented his own annual message, he asserted that he adhered to 
the congressional act on confiscation of property used for insur-
rectionary purposes. If new laws were proposed on the matter, 
" Allan Nevins, Fremont (2 vols., New York, 1928; reissued 19SS), ll, 574; George 
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he said, he would duly consider them. Yet he argued that the 
nation should not hastily adopt "radical and extreme mea-
sures" affecting the loyal as well as the disloyal. 16 
The Louisville Daily Journal saw no difference between the 
president's message and Cameron's report. "The billows of 
anti-slaveryism are running mountain high in Washington," 
warned the editor, "the ... raging sea of fanaticism is thunder-
ing against the barriers of the constitution .. . . Behind these 
barriers stands the President alone .. . . He bends before the 
storm .... Let . . . the conservative sentiment of the nation 
come up promptly and resolutely to the support of the Presi-
dent. " 1' From the Northern press came cries that Kentucky had 
forced the revision of Cameron's report. 31 On December 7, the 
Kentucky General Assembly adopted and forwarded to Lincoln 
a resolution urging Cameron's removal from the cabinet. 19 
Many Northern journals condemned this action as an attempt 
to exercise sovereignty over the federal government; some 
charged that Kentucky was dictating the slave policy of the 
army. When Cameron did resign on January 11, 1862, the Cin-
cinnati Gazette correspondent expressed his belief that the 
removal was engineered by the "neutrality kitchen cabinet" in 
Kentucky. "The path to Washington," he asserted, "was kept 
warm with the feet of the kitchen cabinet officers. "•0 
By January 1862, Lincoln was convinced that some execu-
tive action on slavery was necessary and that a conservative 
stance could best be taken by moving toward gradual emancipa-
tion through state action. Lincoln's friend James Speed had 
introduced in December 1861, in the Kentucky legislature, a bill 
that would allow the army to confiscate the slaves of rebels and 
turn them over to the state for periodic disposal. Calculated to 
give control over confiscated slaves to the state, the bill was in 
"Louisville Daily Journal , December S, 1861. 
" Ibid., December 6, 1861. 
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reaction to Lyman Trumbull's Second Confiscation bill, intro-
duced in the U.S. Senate on December 2 , 1861. Speed's own bill 
caused an uproar in the state senate and was tabled.• 1 Lincoln, 
determined to seek a solution to the slavery problem through 
state action, sent a special message to Congress March 6, 1862, 
setting forth his new program. The president reiterated his state-
ment about radical measures and hinted that such might be 
necessary if the war continued. But, "in my judgment gradual, 
and not sudden emancipation is better for all," he reasoned. 
Lincoln asked Congress to pass a joint resolution offering 
federal compensation to any state that adopted gradual aboli-
tion of slavery. The Ke!ltucky delegation, taking the lead in 
opposing the president's measure when it was introduced, called 
a special meeting to consult on the proposal. With the border 
states united in opposition, the president requested that their 
delegation meet with him on March 11. He pointed out that 
"the conflict concerning slavery in the border states was a seri-
ous annoyance to him and embarrassing to the progress of the 
war"; that it "kept alive a spirit hostile to the Government" 
and strengthened Confederate hopes that the border states 
would eventually join them . Lincoln believed that gradual 
emancipation in these states would shorten the war. Although 
Congress adopted the Lincoln resolution, the Kentucky dele-
gation remained unconvinced. •2 Congressional enactment on 
March 10 of a new article of war, prohibiting use of military 
force to return fugitive slaves, also fell especially heavy on Ken-
tucky because of its extensive free state boundaries. •3 
" James Speed to Lincoln, December 22, 1861, RLP. 
"Basler, Works, V, 144-46. In the House, Criuenden spoke the sentiments of all 
the Kentucky delegation when he asked why Kentucky should be requested to surrender 
"her domestic institution" after she had given up so much for the Union . The reaction 
in Kentucky can best be judged by a leuer Criuenden received from a Kentucky corre-
spondent. II revealed that emotions had reached the boi ling point in the state . "For 
goodness sake keep those cr iu ers off the niggers if they go ahead, we shall have trouble 
in Kentucky," the writer warned. See Blaine, Twenty years of Congress, I, 372-73; 
Uncle Tom 10 John J . Criu enden, May 8, 1862, John J . Criuenden Papers (Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress) . For the Border State Conference, see Charles M. Segal, 
Conversations With Lincoln (New York , 1961), 164; Jo hn G. Nicolay's memorandum, 
March 9, 1862, John Nicolay Manuscripts (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); 
and Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln , V, 212-13. 
' 'Moore, Rebellion Record, IV, 55 . See Special Orders No. 27 , March 21, 1862, 
OR, Ser. II, Vol. S, pt. I , 486, 810. 
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The bill abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, 
which the Congress passed on April 16, Lincoln considered 
unfortunate in its failure to provide for gradual emancipation; 
he regretted that "families would at once be deprived of cooks, 
stable boys, etc.'' After some hesitation, Lincoln signed the bill, 
but not before he had given Kentucky's Charles A. Wickliffe 
sufficient time to remove two slave families from Washington 
so that they would not be freed by the act. 44 
On May 19, 1862, Lincoln voided General David Hunter' s 
emancipation and arming of slaves in the South Atlantic area, 
but he partially nullified the conservatism of that order by 
including an appeal to the border states to accept his proposal 
on a system of gradual emancipation. ' 'You cannot if you 
would, be blind to the signs of the times," he pointed out. • s As 
the war reached a stalemate, Congress moved to its most radical 
position on July 17, when it passed the Second Confiscation Act 
and the Militia Act. The latter gave the president the power to 
make military use of blacks, although Lincoln chose not to use 
that power in 1862. ' 6 
By July, tensions between federal authorities and the Ken-
tucky slaveholding population and their supporters had reached 
a breaking point. Northern pressure on Lincoln was mounting. 
Since the border states had failed to respond to his appeals, and, 
with more radical measures pending in Congress, the president 
on July 12 again summoned their congressmen to the White 
House to urge their support for a plan of gradual emancipation. 
"If the war continues long as it must .. . the institution in your 
states will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion," he 
warned. Lincoln assured the border statesmen that he was 
speaking of gradual emancipation, with colonization in South 
America. Aware that colonization was a popular movement in 
the border states, Lincoln realized that his advocacy of coloni-
"U.S. Statutes A t Large, XII , 592, 599; Theodore C. Pease and J ames G. Randall, 
eds., The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning, 1850-1881 (2 vols., Springfield , Ill ., 
1925- 193 1). I, 541. The aid Lincoln gave Wickliffe was a callous act for one so capable 
of showing so much humanity. 
''Basler, Works, V, 222-23. 
" Mary F. Berry, Military Necessity and Civil Rights Policy: Black Citiunship and 
the Constitution. 1861-1868 (Port Washington, N.Y., 1977). 41 -42. 
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zation would soften the opposition to antislavery measures and 
was in harmony with his efforts during 1861 to establish col-
onies in South America. With the Kentucky delegates taking the 
lead, a large majority of the border state lawmakers rejected the 
president's proposal, however. ., Lincoln had made his last 
effort to salvage his border state policy. 
One day after the border states conference, Lincoln 
revealed to two cabinet members that he was considering issuing 
an emancipation proclamation abolishing slavery in the seces-
sion states, a proposal he presented in a July 22 cabinet meet-
ing." To James and Joshua Speed, who were in Washington at 
the time, Lincoln read a draft of the emancipation document 
and asked their opinion. Joshua advised against issuing the 
proclamation because it would alienate most of the people of 
Kentucky; James insisted the measure was impracticable, that 
"the negro cannot be emancipated by proclamation." Lincoln 
ultimately did not heed the Kentuckians' advice." Cassius M. 
Clay of Kentucky, also in Washington during the summer of 
1862, tried to convince Lincoln that he should emancipate the 
slaves. Later asked by the president to determine the Kentucky 
legislature's position on emancipation of slaves in the Confeder-
ate states, Clay returned from Frankfort to report that Ken-
tucky would not be a problem. ' 0 Although Lincoln had already 
determined to issue the proclamation, he kept his options open 
through the first half of September. ' 1 
Lincoln's proposal to emancipate the slaves of the Confed-
erate South was a "new departure . " n "Things had gone from 
" Basler, Works, IV , 561-62, V, 318- 19. For the involvement of Kentucky in col-
o nization as a means of ending slavery see James P . Gregory, " The Question of Slavery 
in the Kentucky Constitutional Convention of 1849," Filson Club History Quarterly, 23 
(1949), 89-110; Victor B. Howard, " The Kentucky Presbyterians in 1849: Slavery and 
the Kentucky Constitution," Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 73 (1975), 
217-40; and idem, " Robert J. Breckinridge and the Slavery Controversy in Kentucky in 
1849," Filson Club History Quarterly, 53 (1979), 328-43. 
"Howard K. Beale and Alan W. Brownsword, eds., Gideon Welles' Diary (3 vols., 
1960), I, 7 1; Basler, Works, V, 336-37. 
" J oshua Speed to William Herndo n, February 9, 1866, Herndon-Weik Collection 
(Manuscript Division , Library of Congress) . 
"Cassius M. Clay, The life of Cassius Marcellus Clay . .. (Cincinnati, 1886), 310. 
" Basler, Works, V, 423 . 
" Beale, Welles' Diary, I, 71. 
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bad to worse" until Lincoln felt he had "reached the end of his 
rope" on the plan of operations he was pursuing. SJ He had to 
choose between the growing radicalism of the North and the 
stubborn unwillingness of the border states. More important, 
however, were the military developments in relation to the slave 
policy in the border states. Northern soldiers and slaves in Ken-
tucky had reduced Lincoln's Kentucky slave policy to a sham-
bles. 
Lincoln had urged a cautious slave policy in Kentucky from 
the beginning. When Don Carlos Buell was put in command of 
the Department of Ohio in November 1861, General George 
McClellan had instructed him to refrain from interfering with 
slavery in Kentucky, for political affairs in the state were prob-
ably more important than military . "I know I express the feel-
ings and opinions of the President," McClellan wrote.,. Buell 
cooperated with owners who came into the camps to reclaim 
their slaves and, when Henry Halleck took command in the 
West, the policy of not interfering with slavery became more 
pronounced. H 
The Kentucky slaves, however, refused to recognize mili-
tary orders and the Northern soldiers complained about being 
assigned to guard them. By spring 1862, the complaints of sol-
diers against the Kentucky slave policy had become virtually 
unanimous. When the Confederate invasion of Kentucky that 
year caused a general stampede of Kentucky slaves, the North-
ern soldiers progressed from making covert use of slaves to a 
systematic integration of blacks into the work details of the regi-
ments. Finally, by the last quarter of 1862, many regiments were 
overtly acting to destroy slavery in Kentucky. 56 Lincoln knew 
that his generals in Kentucky had been cooperating with slave-
"Francis B. Carpenter, The Inner Life of Abraham Lincoln: Six Months in the 
White House (Boston, 1894), 20-21. 
"George B. McClellan to D. C. Buell, November 12, 1861, OR, Ser. I, Vol. 4, 355. 
"See General Orders No. 3, General H. W. Halleck, November 20, 1861, OR, Ser. 
II , Vol. I, 778; and Special Orders No. 46, H . W. Halleck, February 22, 1862, ibid., 
Ser. I, Vol. 8, 564. John Nicolay and John Hay wrote in 1886 that while General Benja-
min Butler in Virginia "was virtually freeing colored fugitives," Sherman and Buell in 
Kentucky were declaring they had nothing to do with slaves. Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln 
IV, 395. 
"Thomas M. Stevenson, History of the 78/h. Regiment, Ohio Volunteer Infantry 
(Zanesville, Ohio, 1865), 187; Sylvester C. Bishop to Mother, September 5, 186 1, Syl-
vester C. Bishop Civil War Letters (Indiana Historical Society); Reminiscences of Levi 
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holders by returning fugitive slaves in violation of the Second 
Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, but Northern soldiers and 
blacks in Kentucky and the border states forced Lincoln's new 
departure." 
While the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation of Sep-
tember 22, 1862, exempted Kentucky from the decree, Lincoln 
quoted from the new Article of War of March 13, prohibiting 
the return of fugitive slaves, and section nine of the Confisca-
tion Act of July 17, 1862, freeing slaves of rebels. He "enjoined 
upon and ordered all persons engaged in military and naval ser-
vice to observe and enforce" these acts "within their respective 
spheres of service." The War Department issued General 
Orders, No. 1391, September 24, 1862, to enforce these laws. 
Since the Union Army was then in control of all of Kentucky, 
the full effects of the general order immediately applied, but 
General H. G. Wright failed to implement it and left his gen-
erals to their own devices. In violation of the proclamation, 
Generals Green Clay Smith and Q. A. Gillmore in the Central 
District of Kentucky issued orders that aided slaveholders in 
securing return of their slaves, as did General J. T. Boyle, com-
mander of the Western District. sa The department orders engen-
dered explosive tensions between the soldiers and citizens in 
several Kentucky centers. s9 
Coffin (New York, 1968; orig. pub. 1876), 608-09; Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South 
(Boston, 1960), 2%; Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold Hyman, Stanton, The Life and 
Times of Lincoln 's Secretary of War (New York, 1962), 230; Armstead L. Robinson, 
"Day of Jubilo: Civil War and the Demise o f Slavery" (Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Rochester, 1977). 
" Edward McPherson, The Political History of the United States During the Great 
Rebellion (Washington , 1876), 210-11 ; Jo hn David Smith, "The Recruitment of Negro 
Soldiers in Kentucky, 1863-1865," Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 72 
(1974), 364-90. 
"Basler, Works, V, 434-35; General Orders, No. 1391 , September 24, 1862, War 
Department; G. C. Smith to Moses Wisner, October 19, 1862, Order No. 5, October 15, 
1862, Q. A. Gillmore, in Reminiscence of Levi Coffin , 611. 
"Geo rge S. Bradley, The Star Corps; or Notes of An Army Chaplain During Sher-
man's "March to theSea"(Milwaukee, 1865), 66; Paul M. Engle, ed., Three Years in 
the Army of the Cumberland: The Leuers and Diary of Major James A. Connolly 
(Bloomington, Ind., 1959), 27; Journal o f Oliver Spaulding, November 4, 1862; Asa 
Slayton, Civil War Journal, December 5, 1862; and Civil War Diary of William Boston, 
April 15, 1863, page 27, all in Civil War Collection (University of Michigan); Ran-
dolph C. Downes , ed., "The Civil War Diary of Fernando E. Pomeroy," Northwest 
Ohio Quarterly, 19 (1947), 144. 
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The constant complaints, charges, countercharges, and 
denials had become a serious annoyance to Lincoln by March 
1862, and, after issuance of the preliminary decree in Septem-
ber, the tempers of the controversialists had become more in-
flamed . One lawyer had filed fifteen suits against Northern regi-
mental o ffi cers for obstructing the enforcement of Kentucky's 
fugitive slave law. 60 Not only was there a failure to enforce the 
Articles of War and the Confiscation Act in Kentucky, but Lin-
coln seemed to go out of his way to accommodate Kentuckians 
on slavery matters when problems arose elsewhere. 
The most bitter controversy was between Kentucky Court 
of Appeals Justice George Robertson and William L . Utley, 
commander of the Twenty-second Wisconsin Regiment. Col-
onel Utley, who refused to return a fugitive slave against his will 
to Robertson, insisted in a letter to Lincoln that he was acting in 
accord with the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation and 
War Department orders. Lincoln personally offered to pay the 
judge five hundred dollars to set the slave free so the contro-
versy could be resolved. 61 There was no end to the distractions; 
such disputes in Kentucky were increasingly becoming a plague 
on the president.62 The Emancipation Proclamation on Janu-
ary 1, 1863, split the Union party in Kentucky. The Radicals, 
who withdrew from the Union convention because the conser-
vatives wou ld not endorse the Proclamation, elected congress-
"Nicolay and Hay, Works of Lincoln , Vil!, 122; Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln , V, 
212; Ninety-Second 11/inois Volunteers (Freeport , Ill., I 87S). 4S, 46-47, 49; C harles Par-
tridge, ed., History of the Ninety-Sixth Regiment, 11/inois Volunteer lnfantry (Chicago, 
1887), 60, 62 . 
.,Abraham Lincoln to George Roben son, Novem ber 26, 1862, in Basler, Works, 
V, SIS; W. L. Utley to Lincoln , November 19, 1862; W. L. Utley to A . W. Randa ll , 
November 19, 1862, RLP . 
" In October 1862, Co lo nel Lyman Guinnip, commander of the 79th Illi no is Regi-
ment, was indicted for aiding a slave to escape. Lincoln asked his friend, Joshua Speed , 
to "see if you can not slip him through." John Speed, brother o f Joshua, was foreman 
o f the grand jury. Guinnip put up bond and for feited it by not appearing for trial. See 
Lincoln to Joshua Speed, March 17, 1863, in Basler, Works, VI, 140, and Jeffe rson 
County Circuit Court, Book Order No. 9, May 1863 . In January 1864, a civilian 
employee o f the a rmy, in cha rge of refugee blacks at Cairo, Illinois, was found guilt y 
and sentenced to five years imprisonment for tu rning over one of his charges to a loyal 
Kentucky master. Although Lincoln did not doubt his guilt, and despite the secretary of 
war's vigorous protest, Lincoln pardoned the man. See Basler, Works, Vil , 144, 167, 
187, 256, 362, 389; and Senate Executive Document , No. SI , 38th Cong., 1st sess. 
(1864), 20. 
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men in four of the five districts in which they ran candidates; 
and the governor-elect, Thomas E. Bramlette, was considered 
an administration man. 61 
Since December 1862, Lincoln had determined to make 
military use of the slaves . He viewed this as a conservative mea-
sure, one which would hasten peace, forestall more extreme 
action, and possibly prevent revolutionary developments. 64 By 
early 1863 the enlistment of blacks was well under way. During 
the last week of June, probably after Stanton conferred with 
Lincoln, the Provost Marshal General quietly and cautiously 
ordered the enrollment of free blacks in Kentucky. Washington 
was flooded with telegrams from that state. Generals J . T. 
Boyle and A. E. Burnside pleaded with Lincoln to withdraw the 
order and save Kentucky for the Union. Lincoln forwarded 
Burnside's second telegram to Stanton and noted: " I really 
think the within is worth consideration. " 6 5 Enrollment of free 
blacks was halted before it got underway in some Kentucky dis-
tricts . On October I , 1863, Stanton sent Lincoln a memoran-
dum which, according to the secretary, conformed to the views 
expressed earlier by the president. The memorandum stated that 
blacks, both free and slave, would be enlisted in Tennessee, 
Maryland, and Missouri, but not in Kentucky because military 
authorities in the Bluegrass State had impressed some six thou-
sand blacks to build military roads. 66 
After the passage of the Conscription Act of February 24, 
1864, the Provost Marshal General again ordered the enroll-
ment of blacks in Kentucky on March 7, 1864. As soon as that 
order became known, threats of civil and military resistance 
were made. Frank Wolford, colonel of the (U.S.) First Ken-
tucky Cavalry, took the lead. At Lexington on March 10, Gov-
.. E. M . Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky (Gloucester, Mass. , 
1966; orig. pub. 1926), 171, 176. 
" Thomas and Hyman, Stanton , 256. 
" J. T . Boyle to J . B. Fry, June 25, 1863, OR, Ser. III , Vol. 3, 416; A . E. Burnside 
to Lincoln , J une 26, 1863; J . T . Boyle to Lincoln, June 26, 1863, RLP; A . E. Burnside 
to Lincoln, OR, Ser. 111, Vol. 3, 419-20; Lincoln to E. M. Stanton, June 28, 1863, in 
Basler, Works, VI , 299. 
" E. M . Stanton to Lincoln, October l, 1863, and General Orders No. 329, Octo-
ber 3, 1863, the Negro in the Military Service of the U.S. Micro film Chapter 5, Vol. 3, 
pt. 1, 1642-44, 1654-56 (hereinafter NMSUS) National Archives. 
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"One Good Turn Deserves Another." Cartoon in London (England) 
Punch, August 9, 1862. 
ernor Bramlette, a friend and political ally, sat on the platform 
while Wolford made a speech suggesting that enrollment should 
be resisted. Two days earlier, Bramlette had sent a telegram to 
Robert J. Breckinridge urging him to come to Frankfort for a 
conference, and the president was notified that the governor 
would enforce the laws of Kentucky against all who attempted 
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to take slaves without the owner's consent. When Breckinridge 
arrived in Frankfort, the governor had drafted a proclamation 
advising forcible resistance to the enrollment of slaves. In an all-
night session Breckinridge, General S. G. Burbridge, T. S. Bell, 
and editor A. G. Hodges persuaded the governor to revise his 
draft and to advise Kentuckians to submit quietly to the enroll-
ment of blacks and rely on the ballot box and the next Congress 
for justice. J.M. Kelley, a military telegraph operator in Dan-
ville, Kentucky, who accompanied Breckinridge to the confer-
ence with the governor, declared that Bramlette's proclamation 
otherwise would have had the effects of a firebrand thrown 
among the people. 67 
On March 22, Bramlette, former U .S. Senator Archibald 
Dixon, and A. G. Hodges left Frankfort to confer with Lincoln 
on the application of the draft to blacks in Kentucky. The group 
asked the president to refrain from enrolling and enlisting 
blacks in Kentucky. Lincoln did not underestimate the Kentuck-
ians' prediction of the confusion and violence that would result 
from a program to draft slaves in Kentucky. White enlistments 
would dry up in the state.61 When the president informed the 
secretary of war that he thought Bramlette's requests reasonable 
and urged him to give the governor a full hearing, the efforts to 
enroll slaves in Kentucky were briefly shelved. 69 
The Bramlette-Lincoln agreement broke down because 
most of the Kentucky districts did not meet their quota with 
white volunteers, and a draft was necessary. On April 18, Gen-
eral Burbridge initiated the enlistment and drafting of Kentucky 
slaves. Enlistment did not come without resistance: from 
May 13 through July 1864, eight slaves were murdered in 
Nelson County alone for attempting to volunteer; in the course 
., J. M. Kelley's notorized statement concerning the Capital Hotel conference, 
April I, 1864, and other documents in the Breckinridge Family Papers (Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress); Cincinnati Daily Commercial, April I, 1864; Smith, 
"Black Soldiers in Kentucky," 381·82. Governor Bramlette insisted that the revised 
proclamation remained unchanged in substance from the original. Although the 
original is not extant, the evidence is overwhelming that the original , if issued, would 
probably have caused great disorder and violence in Kentucky. 
"Basler, Works, V, 357. 
" Lincoln to E. M. Stanton, March 28 , 1864, RLP; Smith, " Black Soldiers in Ken-
tucky," 383-84. 
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The Kentucky slaveholders' reaction to the Emancipation Proclamation, as 
depicted by cartoonist Thomas Nast. 
of the war seven Kentucky provost marshals were slain.10 
At the Democratic convention in 1864, Bramlette became 
one of the most dedicated supporters of the nominee, George 
McClellan. 11 Following McClellan's election defeat, Lincoln 
sought once more to find common ground with the governor 
and Kentucky. New difficulties relating to slavery, however, 
prevented cordial cooperation. General Burbridge had ap-
pointed James S. Brisbin, an antislavery man, as superintendent 
of Kentucky' s black troops. With Burbridge's assistance, the 
superintendent set out to destroy slavery in Kentucky through a 
massive enlistment program that freed whole families under a 
law enacted early in 1865 . Brisbin accepted almost all males 
regardless of age or physical condition. After the Kentucky leg-
islature failed to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment, Brisbin 
increased his enlistment activities. He informed B. F. Wade that 
"if left alone" he would " kill slavery in Kentucky. " 12 
'°General Orders, No. 34 , April 18, 1864, OR , Ser. Ill , Vol. 4, 233-34; NMSUS, 
2490-91. 
" Louisville Daily Journal, May 26, 1864. 
" J ames Brisbin to B. F. Wade, February 21, 1865, Benjam in Wade Papers (Manu-
script Division, Library o f Congress). 
LINCOLN SLAVE POLICY 305 
Complaints poured into Washington against Brisbin, his 
recruiting officers, and General Burbridge. Governor Bramlette 
informed Lincoln that Burbridge was destroying any possibility 
of reconciling Kentucky and asked that the general be removed. 
Union men who had supported Lincoln in 1864 came to Bur-
bridge's aid and warned Lincoln that his removal would not 
only destroy the Republican party in Kentucky, but would also 
expose administration supporters to violence against their lives 
and property. Both sides sent delegations to Washington. After 
Secretary of State William H. Seward and General William T. 
Sherman sustained Burbridge, he returned to Kentucky with the 
appearance of having been vindicated. Determined to pacify 
Kentucky, Lincoln saw ratification of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment as the greatest hope of settling the turmoil in the state. The 
Burbridge affair promised to broaden his support in Kentucky; 
after a reasonable lapse of time, Lincoln removed Burbridge. 73 
As early as November 1864, Bramlette had been aware of 
Lincoln's plan to have the Thirteenth Amendment brought be-
fore Congress. Lincoln, determined to use every political tool at 
his command to secure congressional approval and state ratifi-
cation, was informed that the Kentucky governor was receptive 
to the idea of the ratif!cation of the amendment. 74 When the 
Kentucky General Assembly convened, Bramlette asked for rat-
ification of the Thirteenth Amendment, with compensation. 
"Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d sess. (January 9, 10, 1865), pt. 1, 160, 161-62, 165. 
For letters of support for Burbridge and warnings of the consequences of removing the 
general, see RLP from December 11 , 1864 to February 23, 1865. Burbridge's execution 
of Confederate sympathizers in reprisal for guerilla raids and his commercial regula-
tions were factors in creating hostility against him in Kentucky. Coulter, Civil War and 
Readjustment, 218, 223, 232-33. 
"Cincinnati Daily Commercial, February 10, 1865; Frankfort Semi-Weekly Com-
monwealth, February 14, 1865; A .G. Hodges to Lincoln, December l, 1864, RLP. In 
December 1864, Lincoln had a conference with James S. Rollins of Missouri. He asked 
Rollins to talk to all the border state delegations in Congress and persuade them to vote 
for the Thirteenth Amendment . "The passage of this Amendment will clinch the whole 
subject, " he said. See I. N. Arnold , The Life of Abraham Lincoln (Chicago, 1885), 
358-59. When the amendment was adopted by Congress, Lincoln expressed the belief 
that the passage o f the amendment would be " the king's cure all for all evils." Cincin-
nati Daily Gazelle, February2, 1865. In 1866, Leonard Swelt, a close friend of Lincoln, 
recalled that when Lincoln set o ut to achieve the approval of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, he resorted "to almost any means" to secure its adoption and ratification. See 
Leonard Swett to W. H. Herndon, January 17, 1866, Herndon-Weik Papers. 
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After he failed to secure even that, Bramlette, in his message to 
the legislature on March 1, reminded the Assembly that their 
failure to ratify would simply defer the question to the people in 
the August election and to the next legislature. Bramlette sent 
Lincoln a copy of his message and, after the legislature ad-
journed, canvassed the state urging the people to vote for those 
who would ratify the amendment. 75 
The removal of Burbridge, considered an important leader 
of the administration party in Kentucky, had demoralized the 
Union forces in the legislature. Before his removal, Unionists 
had been able to mobilize forty-five votes in the General As-
sembly for L. H. Rousseau, their candidate for Kentucky's U.S. 
Senate seat. After the general's dismissal, Unionists could mus-
ter only twenty-three votes in favor of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. "Many of our friends, not feeling disposed to stand a fire 
both in the front and rear have gone and given up the contest," 
a disillusioned Radical Unionist informed Massachusetts 
Senator Henry Wilson. The editor of the Lexington National 
Unionist charged that Lincoln and Bramlette had struck a 
bargain on the Thirteenth Amendment, and with the removal of 
Burbridge the administration had "given a stab to the Union 
cause in Kentucky" that he feared "no subsequent acts" could 
repair. 76 It was common knowledge in Kentucky that Bramlette 
had made overtures to Lincoln suggesting that if the General 
were removed, ''he [the governor] would have the Amendment 
.. . ratified by the Legislature. " 77 Burbridge was using the 
army as a tool for the destruction of slavery in Kentucky, an act 
which was the essence of radicalism. Lincoln preferred the con-
servatism of the constitutional process of amendment, and he 
"T. E. Bramlette to Lincoln, March 2, 1865, RLP; Chicago Daily Tribune, June 2, 
1865; Semi-Weekly Reporter, March 4, 1865. For Bramlette's canvass, see Cincinnati 
Daily Enquirer, June 30, 1865, and Cincinnati Daily Commercial, June 14, 30, July 1, 
18, 1865. E. H. Ludington, War Department Investigator who was sent to Kentucky for 
an investigatio n in 1864, reported that Bramleue was motivated in his action by the 
desire to be senator. See E. H. Ludingto n to E. M. Stanton, December 7, 1864, OR, 
Ser. I, Vol. 45, pt. 2, 93-94. 
"Semi-Weekly National Unionist , January 3, February 24, 1865; W. R. Kinney to 
Henry Wilson, February 23, 1865, and T. E. Bramlette to Lincoln , March 2, 1865 , 
RLP. 
"Semi-Weekly National Unionist, February 24, 28, 1865. 
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left no stone unturned to accomplish his objective. The Thir-
teenth Amendment offered a law-and-order solution to the 
problem of slavery; the elimination of slavery by use of the 
army was a violent denial of law-and-order. 71 
By 1865, the president was preoccupied with the restoration 
of the Union. The avoidance of bitterness and the cessation of 
agitation in Kentucky were foremost. Lincoln's approach had 
always been to convert opponents to a cause, instead of alienat-
ing them. In 1842, he had advised a group of reformers that "if 
you would win a man to your cause, first convince him that you 
are his sincere friend. Therein is a drop of honey that catches his 
heart. .. , and which, when once gained, you will have little 
trouble in convincing his judgment of the justice of your 
cause. " 79 The Frankfort Commonwealth explained Burbridge's 
removal: "Mr. Lincoln had to change his commanders here, or 
give the whole of his time to the management of Kentucky 
affairs.' ' 10 Lincoln's choice was either to sustain the administra-
tion party in Kentucky and rely on a local military solution to 
the slavery problem, or to secure broader support for the Thir-
teenth Amendment in the state and wait for a national resolu-
tion of the slavery problem. He chose to desert the Kentucky 
Radicals. 
Throughout the war Lincoln remained consistently conser-
vative, yet he pragmatically changed with the progress of events. 
He kept compensation in mind as a possible solution to the dif-
ficult problems that faced the president and the nation.11 Lin-
coln considered the support of Kentucky and the border states 
essential to a conservative Union policy, and the keystone had 
been compensation and colonization. The president urged com-
pensated emancipation on the border states as a measure to 
head off military emancipation. But when his proposal was 
rejected, he was "driven to the alternative of either surrendering 
"George Fredrickson, "The Search For Order and Community," in The Public 
and Private Lincoln: Contemporary Perspectives, 95. 
"Basler, Works, l, 272-73. 
'°Frankfort Semi-Weekly Commonwealth, February 24, 1865. 
"Allen Rice, ed., Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln By Distinguished Men of His 
Times (New York, 1909), 224; Alexander McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-
Times (Philadelphia, 1892), 106. 
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the Union, and with it the Constitution, or of laying strong 
hands" upon the slaves. In April 1864, in a conversation with 
the governor of Kentucky, Lincoln confirmed that his approach 
to the slavery problem was less than radical. " I claim not to 
have controlled events," he said , "but confess plainly that 
events have controlled me.' ' 12 Three days later, while conferring 
with a group of abolitionists and Radicals in reference to enlist-
ing border state slaves in military service, Lincoln confessed: "I 
have done what no man could have helped doing standing in my 
place. "IJ 
There is much truth in C . Vann Woodward's argument that 
Negro equality "never gained from Lincoln even the qualified 
support he gave to abolition . " 1• W.ith public sentiment in 
benevolent circles leaning toward a more progressive stance 
where black soldiers were involved, 11 Lincoln pragmatically 
altered his moderate position in Louisiana to a willingness to 
permit the provisional governor of that state to grant black suf-
frage to the intelligent, literate, French-speaking blacks who 
had fought for the Union. 86 Lincoln felt that this select use of 
black suffrage would be backed by public opinion and would 
check the Radical drive. Lincoln's position on Reconstruction 
in Louisiana was in keeping with his past actions and the posi-
tion he took in Kentucky in 1865. Up to the end, the president 
was driven to harmonize his policies with the broad American 
sentiment and public opinion on the slavery question. When ac-
tion was demanded, Lincoln instinctively opted for the less 
radical solution; but when this failed or necessity demanded, he 
pragmatically moved to check the progression of more radical 
developments by placing himself solidly in an advanced posi-
tion. 
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